Forecasting short term yield changes using order flow. Is dealer skill a source of predictability? by Valseth, Siri




This paper investigates the process of price discovery in government bond markets.
By using a new data set including interdealer trades, customer trades, trade types and
dealer identities, the paper explores the role of dealers in the price formation process
and seeks to identify their sources of information. At the aggregate level the results
show that interdealer order ￿ ow is highly informative, explaining one fourth of daily yield
changes, while customer order ￿ ow has little explanatory power. At the individual dealer
level the results reveal that dealers contribute di⁄erently in the price discovery process.
They appear to be heterogeneously informed and have di⁄erent sources of information.
While some informed dealers extract information from their customer trades, others could
acquire information through their skill in collecting and interpreting relevant information.
This suggests that dealers are not mere intermediaries of customer trades, but play an
independent role in the price discovery process in government bond markets.
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The process of price formation is largely ignored in traditional economic models, which
assume that prices adjust instantaneously to new information. The assumption of im-
mediate price adjustment applies equally to public and private information. The market
microstructure literature advocates a di⁄erent view. In microstructure models the process
of price formation is crucial and private information plays a key role. Private information
is de￿ned by Lyons (2001) as information, not known by all, that produces a better price
forecast than public information alone. According to the market microstructure literature
the process of price formation is carried out through two channels; a direct channel where
prices adjust immediately to new public information, and an indirect channel, referred to
as price discovery, where prices adjust over time to private information conveyed through
order ￿ ow.1 The gradual adjustment of prices through the indirect channel implies that
prices do not fully re￿ ect all available information at any point in time.
Hasbrouck (1991), Evans and Lyons (2002) and Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) support
the market microstructure view by showing that order ￿ ow plays an important role in
the price formation process in stock markets, foreign exchange markets and government
bond markets, respectively. They ￿nd that order ￿ ow contains private information and
explains a substantial part of daily price changes in these asset markets. This paper
further explores the process of price discovery in sovereign bond markets. A new data set
including interdealer trades, customer trades, trade types and the identities of the buying
and selling dealers, allows for an investigation into the role of dealers in the price discovery
process and the sources of information in interdealer order ￿ ow.
This study has two major contributions. The ￿rst is to compare the informational
content of interdealer order ￿ ow to that of customer order ￿ ow. The paper measures
the price impact of interdealer order ￿ ow, total customer order ￿ ow, and a measure of
informed customer order ￿ ow on bond yields. Previous studies employ either interdealer
order ￿ ow or customer order ￿ ow, but not both. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), Anand and
Subrahmanyam (2008) and Evans and Lyons (2002) use interdealer order ￿ ow from the
1Order ￿ ow is a measure of the net buying pressure in the market, and is calculated by subtracting
seller initiated trades from buyer initiated trades during a time interval. A buyer-initiated trade will have
a positive sign and a seller-initiated trade will have a negative sign.
2bond, equity and currency markets respectively. Evans and Lyons (2005) use customer
order ￿ ow from the currency market and Menkveld, Sarkar and van der Wel (2011) use
customer order ￿ ow from the bond futures market. This paper employs a unique data
set that enables the identi￿cation of interdealer trades, customer trades and delayed pub-
lication trades. Delayed publication customer trades are used as a proxy for informed
customer trades. These trades are not visible to other traders until after a period of delay.
Dealers are likely to choose this alternative if they believe a customer trade contain pri-
vate information, and they can bene￿t from this information before it becomes available
to their competitors.
The second contribution of this paper is to explore whether dealers are heterogeneous
and play di⁄erent roles in the price discovery process. Are dealers di⁄erently informed
and do they have di⁄erent sources of information? Are some dealers pure intermediaries
while other dealers possess skill in collecting and interpreting relevant information that
they subsequently trade on? Unlike the data sets used in previous studies, this data set
includes the identities of the buying and selling dealers for each trade. It is therefore
possible to compare the contribution of each dealer in the price formation process. This
type of individual dealer analysis has not been undertaken so far due to a lack of data. By
studying the characteristics of the dealers, including market share, relative activity in the
interdealer market and the correlation between customer order ￿ ow and interdealer order
￿ ow, we may infer the sources of information of di⁄erent dealers.
In sovereign bond markets private information can be divided into types along two
dimensions. The ￿rst dimension is related to whether private information re￿ ect funda-
mental or non-fundamental information. Fundamental private information is related to
macroeconomic factors, for example heterogeneous interpretations of macroeconomic in-
dicators like consumer and producer surveys for future in￿ ation, employment and GDP
growth. Examples of non-fundamental private information are changes in liquidity con-
ditions, auction volumes or hedging demands. Fundamental private information will in-
￿ uence expected future short rates and risk premia through the macroeconomic outlook,
while non-fundamental private information related to, for example, supply conditions will
in￿ uence liquidity risk premia.
The second dimension is related to the source of private information. Many empirical
3studies employ interdealer order ￿ ow, and two frequently mentioned sources of information
in interdealer order ￿ ow are customer trades and dealer skill. If the information in inter-
dealer order ￿ ow re￿ ects the information in customer order ￿ ow only, this indicates that
the dealer does not add any information. In this case dealers are passive intermediaries of
customer orders and customer trades are considered to be the source of information in in-
terdealer order ￿ ow. If interdealer order ￿ ow is more informative than customer order ￿ ow,
this indicates that dealers possess more information than their customers. Dealers may
obtain extra information by using skill in collecting and interpreting relevant information.
Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008) ￿nd that dealers contribute more to price discovery
than their customers and conclude that dealers are better informed than other market
participants. In this case dealer skill can be considered to be a source of information. In
equity markets, insider information related to for example mergers or new orders may be
a third source of information, but this type of information is unlikely to be of importance
in sovereign bond markets. Two possible sources of information in interdealer order ￿ ow
are considered in this paper: customer trades and dealer skill.
The results in this study show that interdealer order ￿ ow in the Norwegian government
bond market contains information about bond yields. Aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow
explains one fourth of daily yield changes in 3, 5 and 10 year government bonds. Order
￿ ow is divided into short, medium and long term order ￿ ow according to the remaining
time to maturity of the bonds included.2 All three order ￿ ow groups have a signi￿cant
impact on yield changes of all maturities, but the strongest e⁄ect is on the same maturity
yield change. Short term order ￿ ow thus has the highest impact on 3 year yield changes,
but has a signi￿cant impact on 5 and 10 year yield changes also. These results indicate
that there is information in the order ￿ ow of short term, medium term and long term
bonds and that the information to a large extent, but not only, causes parallel shifts in
this part of the yield curve. The information in interdealer order ￿ ow may thus be related
to interpretations of macroeconomic news in￿ uencing 3 to 10 year yields by roughly the
same, but also to other private information related to for example news on hedging and
investment strategies in￿ uencing some maturities only.
2Short term order ￿ ow includes the trades in bonds with a remaining time to maturity from 1 to 4
years, medium term order ￿ ow includes trades in bonds with a maturity greater than 4 years up to 7 years
and long term order ￿ ow includes trades in bonds with a maturity greater than 7 years up to 11 years.
4The results further document that customer trades are far less informative than inter-
dealer trades. Aggregate customer order ￿ ow explains up to 1 percent of daily variation
in yields, compared to 24 percent for aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow. When using a
proxy for informed customer order ￿ ow, leaving out uninformed customers, the explana-
tory power of customer order ￿ ow increases to 2 percent of the daily variation in bond
yields. The increased explanatory power of informed customer order ￿ ow indicates that
dealers, at least partially, are able to identify their informed customers. The di⁄erences
in the explanatory power of interdealer order ￿ ow and customer order ￿ ow suggest that
dealers are better informed than their customers. By aggregating information from their
own customer trades and the trades of other dealers, and by processing public information
related to bond markets, dealers could be better informed than their customers.3
At the dealer level, the results show that dealers are heterogeneous and that they
contribute in di⁄erent ways to the price discovery process. The order ￿ ow of large dealers,
measured by market share, has the largest price impact. The interdealer order ￿ ows of
the two largest dealers have the highest price impact on 3 and 5 year bonds, whereas the
order ￿ ows of the fourth largest dealer has the highest price impact on 10 year bonds.
Also, order ￿ ow at di⁄erent maturities has a di⁄erent price impact depending on dealer.
Whereas the medium term order ￿ ow has the highest price impact on all yield changes
for one dealer, the long term order ￿ ow has the highest price impact for other dealers.
This suggests that dealers specialize in trading at di⁄erent segments of the yield curve and
therefore concentrate their interdealer trading to this segment. The fact that a dealer￿ s
interdealer order ￿ ow in one segment in￿ uences both short, medium and long term yields
con￿rms the results at the aggregate level that much of the information contained in the
order ￿ ow of government bonds is common for all the segments of the yield curve included
in this study.
The results at the dealer level also show that the connection between customer or-
der ￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow varies among dealers. Whereas customer order ￿ ow
explains a substantial part of interdealer order ￿ ow for some dealers with high price im-
pact, customer order ￿ ows appear to be unrelated to the interdealer order ￿ ow of other
3Customers in the government bond market include insurance companies, institutional investors, do-
mestic ￿rms, foundations and individuals.
5high-impact dealers. This indicates that dealers to a varying degree possess information
additional to what they learn from their customer trades. Additional information could be
acquired through dealer skill in collecting and processing relevant news. Examples of this
type of information would be interpretation of macroeconomic data and the aggregation
of dispersed private information held by other market participants. This is in line with
the ￿ndings of Manaster and Mann (1996) who study the market for commodity futures,
Osler, Mende and Menkho⁄ (2007) who study the foreign exchange market, and Anand
and Subrahmanyam (2008) who study the equity market. Their ￿ndings indicate that
dealers are not mere intermediaries of customer trades, but that they actively seek and
aggregate information.
In all, the ￿ndings in this study show that dealers play an important role in the price
formation process in the Norwegian government bond market and that the contribution
varies substantially among dealers. One source of information in interdealer order ￿ ow
appears to be customer orders, but the results also suggest that there is an additional
source of information which could be related to dealer skill. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y discusses related literature. Section 3 describes the
market settings and data. Section 4 discusses possible dealer strategies. Section 5 presents
the econometric framework and the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
This study is related to Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) who examine the price formation
process in the US Treasury market. They divide interdealer order ￿ ow into six maturity
groups along the yield curve and control for the e⁄ect of lagged yields by including the
lagged three ￿rst principal components of yields. They then separate days with macroeco-
nomic news from days with no news and investigate the e⁄ect of order ￿ ow on contem-
poraneous yield changes on no-news days. They ￿nd that up to 26 percent of daily yield
changes on no-news days can be accounted for by interdealer order ￿ ow. They control
for inventory e⁄ects by investigating whether the yield changes are reversed within the
next few days, and conclude that the yield changes are permanent and therefore due to
new information. This paper employs a similar method by dividing order ￿ ow into three
6maturity groups and by including the lagged ￿rst principal component of bond yields in
the price impact regressions. The paper extends the work by Brandt and Kavajecz (2004)
by including both customer order ￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow as well as individual
dealer order ￿ ow.
This paper is also related to studies concerned with the sources of private information
and the role of dealers in the price formation process. Manaster and Mann (1996) study
the behavior of market makers in various futures contracts at the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (CME). They conclude that market-makers are active pro￿t-seeking individuals
with heterogeneous levels of information and trading skill. Osler, Mende and Menkho⁄
(2007) investigate the process of price discovery in currency markets, and ￿nd that it
takes place in the interdealer market rather than in the customer market. Anand and
Subrahmanyam (2008) study price formation in equity markets and ￿nd that intermedi-
aries (dealers) are better informed than their clients because of their advantage and skill
in actively seeking and trading on information. Menkveld, Sarkar and van der Wel (2011)
study the Treasury futures market, and ￿nd that customer order ￿ ow is crucial for price
discovery since it conveys information about customer￿ s risk preferences and endowments.
This paper di⁄ers from the existing literature by employing a new, comprehensive data
set including all the trades in the secondary market for government bonds. Instead of ex-
amining either the interdealer market, like Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), the customer
market, like Menkveld, Sarkar and van der Wel (2011), or a purely electronic market
including both dealer initiated and customer initiated trades, like Anand and Subrah-
manyam (2008), the analysis in this paper includes the complete bond market and can
examine the relationship between the di⁄erent parts. Osler, Mende and Menkho⁄ (2007)
also include both the interdealer and customer markets, but only for one dealer. Also,
the paper di⁄ers from the existing literature because it can identify all major dealers and
therefore explore the role of each dealer in both markets. It is thus possible to observe to
what extent customer trades are re￿ ected in the interdealer trades of the di⁄erent dealers.
This enables the investigation of the sources of information in bond market order ￿ ow.
73 Market structure and data
The Norwegian government market is organized similarly to major government bond mar-
kets. A system of primary dealers contributes a liquid and well functioning market. Pri-
mary dealers have a set of rights and obligations formalized in contracts with the Treasury.
The obligations include continuous quoting of ￿rm bid and ask prices at a maximum spread
and a minimum amount for each bond. Primary dealers are also expected to participate
in auctions of government bonds. Rights include an exclusive repo arrangement adminis-
tered by the Central Bank. Under this arrangement primary dealers can borrow a ￿xed
amount in each benchmark bond at a low cost from the Treasury for a period from one
up to ten days. The facility is meant to contribute to a more liquid market by increasing
the dealers￿ability to continuously quote prices and thus limit large price movements. In
order to quickly replenish inventory after a sale a dealer can therefore borrow this bond
from the Central Bank.
The secondary market for Norwegian government bonds is a two-tier market consisting
of an interdealer market and a customer market. Figure 1 shows a simpli￿ed overview
of the trading environment. Only dealers can execute trades in the electronic trading
system administered by the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). Therefore, customers must trade
through dealers and cannot trade directly with each other. As illustrated in Figure 1,
dealers have access to both markets as they can trade with each other and with their
customers, whereas customers only have access to the customer market. Dealers are
de￿ned as exchange members that are approved for bond trading. To be approved for
bond trading members must comply with a set of rules and obligations including technical
requirements. Typical exchange members are banks and brokerage ￿rms. Customers are
de￿ned as all traders that are not exchange members. The majority of interdealer trading
activity involves primary dealers.
Auctions in government bonds are held six to eight times a year according to a pre-
announced auction calendar. The number of outstanding bonds varies between 4 and 6
benchmark bonds. In 2000 there were ￿ve outstanding benchmark bonds with a daily
average turnover in each bond of about 200 million US dollars. Every other year a new
11 year benchmark bond is launched. It is reopened regularly until it has reached a size
8deemed su¢ cient. Table 1 lists the 7 benchmark bonds that were outstanding and traded
in the secondary market during the sample period. The interdealer share of the trading
activity is roughly 35 percent. Customer trades are on average larger than interdealer
trades.
The amount of outstanding central government debt in Norway was about 33 billion
US dollars in 2000. In comparison central government debt in 2000 amounted to 34 billion
US dollars in Ireland, 137 billion US dollars in Sweden and 169 billion US dollars in the
Netherlands. The US government debt amounted to more than 3 trillion US dollars.4
Average daily turnover in government bonds was close to 1 billion US dollars including
repos in Norway compared to 2.1 billion US dollars in Sweden and 290 billion US dollars
in the United States.5 In Norway, the number of primary dealers in government bonds
has varied between eight and six in the period 1999 to 2005. The number of primary
dealers in government bonds was in 2000 six in Ireland, eight in Sweden, thirteen in the
Netherlands and twenty in the US Treasury market. Compared to other government bond
markets the Norwegian market is relatively small. However, in order to promote liquidity
the government has limited the number of bonds to a few large benchmark bonds. Thus,
the results in this study should be relevant for other sovereign bond markets.
The unique data set used in this paper includes all transactions in the interdealer
market and the customer market, as well as the best bid and ask prices submitted by
dealers at the OSE over the period from September 6, 1999 to September 30, 2005. For each
transaction the date, time, price, amount, the identity of the buying and the selling dealer
and the type of trade is observed. Di⁄erent types of trades include auto-match (electronic)
trades, ordinary over-the-counter trades, non-standard settlement over-the-counter trades,
trades registered outside market opening hours, repo trades, delayed publication trades
and auction allocations in the primary market. Repo trades, auction allocations, and
trades with a trade amount of less than 1 million Norwegian kroner (180 000 US dollars)
are excluded from the data set as the informational content of these trades is assumed to
be limited. The total number of trades included in the analysis is 66,650.
4Outstanding government debt in percent of current GDP in USD and PPPs was in 2000 about 20
percent in Norway, 56 percent in Sweden, 31 percent in Ireland, 36 percent in the Netherlands and 31
percent in the United States.
5Average daily turnover in year 2000 was 8 billion NOK including repos and 2 billion NOK without
repos.
9Trading takes place both in the electronic trading book and in the over-the-counter
market. The share of electronic trading and the average electronic trade size has increased
gradually since the inception of an electronic order book in 1999. Still, a majority of
interdealer trades are over-the-counter trades. Also most customer trades are over-the-
counter trades. It is important to note that the customer trades and interdealer trades
are distinguished by using the identities of the buying and selling dealers. Trades which
have di⁄erent dealers on the buy side and the sell side are de￿ned as interdealer trades,
and trades which have the same dealer on both sides are de￿ned as customer trades. In a
customer trade the dealer will appear as both the buyer and the seller of the bonds because
customers must trade through a dealer. When a trade with a customer is agreed upon,
the dealer will enter both sides of the transaction in the OSE trading system, SAXESS.
Also proprietary trades and brokered trades are registered with the same dealer as the
buyer and seller, and are thus classi￿ed as customer trades in this study.6 Information on
dealer identities is not available to all market participants, only to the dealers involved in
the trade.
Delayed publication trades are trades entered into the trading system without immedi-
ately appearing on the screen of the other dealers and are thus unobservable for a certain
time period. This type of trade was granted in order to make it easier for primary dealers
to accommodate the requests of large customers and to allow market makers to unwind
their inventory positions at minimal cost. The conditions for delayed publication trades,
including the period of delay, has changed over the sample period. From 1999 to 2002
there was a two hour delay for trades amounting to 200 million Norwegian kroner or more.
From May 2002, with the inception of SAXESS, publication was delayed to the end of the
trading day which is 4 p.m., no matter when the trade was entered into, and the size limit
was abandoned. Also, SAXESS opened up for the possibility to choose delayed publication
as default. Some dealers may have opted for this as the number of delayed publication
trades increased from mid-2002.
In this study, delayed publication customer trades are used as a proxy for informed
customer trades. It is likely that dealers will choose to enter trades from informed cus-
6Proprietary trades are in a sense internal customer trades or informed customer trades. Brokered
interdealer trades are interdealer trades through a broker where the real counterparty is unknown.
10tomers as delayed publication trades in order to bene￿t from the trade information before
it becomes available to other dealers. If dealers can identify their informed customers, and
enter these trades as delayed publication trades, they will gain private information that
will be hidden from the other market participants. They can then trade on this infor-
mation in the interdealer market before prices are updated with this information. When
these trades become visible to the other dealers, prices will be, at least partially, updated
accordingly. In the analysis the sample is divided into two sub-periods to control for the
e⁄ects of the changes in the conditions for delayed publication trades from mid-2002.
The bid-ask spreads prevailing at the time right before the trade are used to determine
the direction of the trades. Since order ￿ ow is a measure of the net buying pressure in
the market it is necessary to know whether a trade is initiated by the buyer or the seller
of the bond in order to calculate it. A buyer-initiated trade is given a positive sign and a
seller-initiated trade is given a negative sign. As this information is not observed in the
data set the method of Lee and Ready (1991) is used to sign the trades.7 The signed trades
are then aggregated into daily order ￿ ow. The signed trades can be given equal weights,
in which case each buyer initiated trade is given the value +1 and each seller initiated
trade is given the value -1, or they can be measured according to size, in which case the
trade volume in Norwegian kroner is used as weight. Order ￿ ow can thus be measured
in number of trades or volume. As a main rule the former method is used in this study.
This is in line with Fleming (2003) who ￿nds that using the number of trades gives better
explanatory power than using the volume. However, in section 5.3, when studying the
relationship between interdealer and customer order ￿ ow for individual dealers, order ￿ ow
is measured as the net volume of trades in Norwegian kroner. To determine the extent
to which informed customer trades are a source of information in interdealer order ￿ ow,
order ￿ ow based on volume is used. This will indicate how much of the customer trade
volume is passed on to the interdealer market and provide a more precise relationship
between the customer trades and interdealer trades of a dealer. Trading strategies vary
between dealers and a large customer trade can be passed on to the interdealer market as
one large trade or as many small trades.
7Trades that are executed at a price less than the mid price are classi￿ed as seller-initiated, and trades
that are executed at a price higher than the mid price are classi￿ed as buyer-initiated. For trades executed
at the mid price, the tick rule is used.
11In order to measure the price impact of daily order ￿ ow, daily changes in synthetic 3,
5 and 10 year government bond yields are employed. These yields are based on end of day
prices of the bonds in Table 1 and are calculated by Norges Bank8. Order ￿ ow is divided
into three matching maturity groups. The ￿rst, short term order ￿ ow, contains trades in
bonds with a remaining time to maturity between 1 and 4 years. The second, medium
term order ￿ ow, contains trades in bonds with a remaining time to maturity greater than
4 years up to 7 years. The third group, long term order ￿ ow, contains trades in bonds
with a remaining time to maturity greater than 7 years up to 11 years. The three maturity
segments of interdealer order ￿ ow are labelled OFS, OFM and OFL respectively, and the
corresponding segments of customer order ￿ ow are labelled COFS, COFM and COFL.
The data set used in this study contains 1505 days. Several studies of bond markets
distinguish between days with macroeconomic news and days with no news, and include
either news days or no-news days depending on the questions addressed. Studies like
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) which are exploring the role of price discovery include no-
news days only. This is to eliminate price movements due to the release of public news.
If the sensitivity of prices to order ￿ ow is lower than usual around the announcement of
economic news, the e⁄ect of order ￿ ow on prices should be lower on news days than on
no-news days. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) therefore eliminate the direct e⁄ect of public
news on prices by excluding the three days surrounding announcement days from their
sample. In order to assess the e⁄ect of public information on Norwegian bond yields, the
data set is divided into news days and no-news days in Table 2. The most in￿ uential news
for the Norwegian bond market are related to in￿ ation and changes in the monetary policy
rate. News on domestic GDP, unemployment and other macroeconomic indicators have
little impact on the prices in the bond market. News days are thus identi￿ed as the 3 days
surrounding the release of the monthly Consumer Price Index and the press release from
Monetary Policy meetings.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of daily yield changes, interdealer and customer
order ￿ ow of di⁄erent maturity groups on all days, no-news days and news days. The
table shows that average yield changes are larger on news days than on no-news days,
indicating that news on in￿ ation and monetary policy has considerable impact on bond
8Norges Bank is the Norwegian Central Bank.
12yields. Table 2 further indicates that average interdealer order ￿ ow is about the same
on news days and no-news days for long term order ￿ ow. For medium term order ￿ ow
the mean is smaller on news days than on no-news days, and for short term order ￿ ow
the mean is larger on news days than on no-news days. Di⁄erences in customer order
￿ ow between news days and no-news days are also relatively small and we conclude that
order ￿ ow is not greatly in￿ uenced by the direct e⁄ect of news on in￿ ation and monetary
policy. This paper therefore includes all days in the analysis. If any, the e⁄ect of including
all days instead of no-news days only should be that the e⁄ect of order ￿ ow on prices is
smaller than otherwise. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for informed customer order
￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal to informed customer order ￿ ow for the three
maturity groups.
Table 4 shows the unconditional correlations between yield changes and order ￿ ows of
di⁄erent maturities. Yield changes are strongly and positively correlated with each other
indicating that a large part of yield changes occurs as parallel shifts in the yield curve.
The correlations between yields and interdealer order ￿ ow are signi￿cant and negative
indicating that positive order ￿ ow is related to higher bond prices and lower yields. This
suggests that interdealer order ￿ ow contains news relevant for bond prices. In contrast,
the correlations between yield changes and customer order ￿ ow are much weaker and only
signi￿cant for long term customer order ￿ ow.
Table 5 shows common yield factors and common order ￿ ow factors extracted by
performing principal components analysis. The principal components of the bond yields
are in line with those found for the US Treasury market in Brandt and Kavajecz (2004).
The ￿rst common factor explains nearly 99 percent of the variation in yields and loads
about equally on all maturities. This factor is therefore referred to as the ￿level￿factor by
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991). The second and third factors are labelled the ￿slope￿
and the ￿curvature￿factors. The slope factor explains one percent, and the curvature
factor almost none, of the variation in the 3 to 10 year bond yields during this period. The
principal components of order ￿ ow are also extracted. There appears to be one dominant
factor in interdealer order ￿ ow explaining 48 percent of the variation. The factor loads a
little more on intermediate and short maturities than on long maturities. Customer order
￿ ow seems to have no dominant factor as the three factors explain about one third of the
13variation each. The factor structure of interdealer order ￿ ow combined with relatively low
correlations across maturities indicates that there is less commonality in di⁄erent maturity
order ￿ ow than in di⁄erent maturity yields. This could imply that the information re￿ ected
by order ￿ ow in the di⁄erent maturity segments is di⁄erent.
4 Dealer strategies
This paper investigates the role of dealers in the process of price discovery in bond markets.
Do dealers have an active role in price discovery or are they just passive intermediaries
of customer orders? One approach to this topic is to study the interaction between the
customer market and the interdealer market. Figure 1 showed the connection between the
customer and interdealer markets and illustrated how dealers report all trades into the
SAXESS trading system. Customer trades (C-trades) and interdealer trades (I-trades) are
distinguished by who the buying and the selling dealers are. As mentioned in the previous
section, customer trades have the same buying and selling dealer while interdealer trades
involve two di⁄erent dealers. After a trade with a customer is executed, the dealer can
pass it on to other dealers, or let her inventory change. If she chooses to pass it on to
other dealers she can use market orders or limit orders. Market orders are trades that
are transacted to the prevailing market prices and agreed on by the two parties over the
phone (over-the-counter trades) or by the trader by accepting the quote in the order book
(electronic trades). Limit orders are orders placed at a price di⁄ering from the prevailing
market price either by phone or by entering a bid or an ask quote in the electronic order
book. Market participants who use market orders are, unlike those who use limit orders,
the initiators of trades. While market orders are executed immediately, it can take time
before limit orders are executed. Limit orders also have a risk of not being executed. An
impatient trader is thus likely to use market orders and a patient trader is likely to use
limit orders.
In order to investigate whether dealers acquire information from their customer trades,
this paper analyzes the relationship between a dealer￿ s trades in the customer market
and the interdealer market. If a dealer￿ s order ￿ ow is informative and there is a positive
relationship between her customer order ￿ ow and her interdealer order ￿ ow, it is concluded
14that customer trades is an important source of information. However, this conclusion is
based on the assumption that the dealer uses market orders. This is because a dealer￿ s
interdealer order ￿ ow by de￿nition consists of her initiated interdealer trades. If a dealer
uses market orders when she passes on her customer trades to other dealers, the customer
trades will be re￿ ected in her interdealer order ￿ ow. If she passes the customer trades
on to other dealers by using limit orders, the customer trade will not be re￿ ected in her
interdealer order ￿ ow, but in her counterparty￿ s interdealer order ￿ ow. The use of limit
orders instead of market orders will thus reduce the link between the dealer￿ s interdealer
order ￿ ow and customer order ￿ ow.
The interaction between the two markets can be discussed in the context of mar-
ket microstructure models of the Glosten-Milgrom type.9 In these models there are one
market-maker (dealer) and two types of traders (customers); informed and uninformed.
An informed trader possesses private information about the true value of the asset, and
will trade on this information. She will buy the asset only if she has positive informa-
tion and sell it only if she has negative information. An uninformed trader, often called
a liquidity trader, trades for reasons exogenous to the model. Uninformed trades could
for example be related to the rebalancing of indexed portfolios or raising cash. An unin-
formed trader is expected to be equally likely to buy and sell the asset as the trades are
independent of the expected future value of the asset. The market maker in this model
will set prices equal to her conditional expectation of the value of the asset given the type
of trade, a buy or a sell, that occurs. Expectations are assumed to be updated through
a Bayesian learning model containing prior probabilities for the occurrence of informed
versus uninformed traders and the occurrence of good versus bad news. The model is
mainly concerned with the price process and how a market-maker sets quotes.10 It does
not describe the trading behavior of the dealer, but the logic of the model can be used to
derive possible dealer strategies.
Based on the reasoning in this type of model a dealer may choose the trading strategy
depicted in Figure 2. The strategy requires that she can identify her informed customers.
In Figure 2 the dealer ￿rst receives a customer trade and then decides whether the trade is
9See O￿ Hara (1995) for a description of these types of models.
10Quotes are the bid and ask prices set by a market-maker.
15informed or not. If the customer trade is considered informed the dealer will subsequently
initiate a trade in the same direction in the interdealer market.11 If the customer trade
is considered uninformed the dealer will enter a limit order in the same direction in the
interdealer market or let her inventory change. Figure 2 thus illustrates a strategy where
the dealer o⁄-loads risk in the interdealer market by using market orders if the customer
is considered informed and limit orders if the customer is considered uninformed. In
the latter case the dealer can also choose to add the uninformed customer trade to her
inventory. She could then wait for an uninformed customer trade in the opposite direction
to change her inventory again.
The strategy described above assumes that a dealer can identify her informed cus-
tomers. A dealer may identify an informed customer based on conversations prior to the
trade or on past trading history. A dealer who possess private information is likely to be
an impatient market participant who would like to trade right away in order to bene￿t
from this information. If she has to wait the price may change before she is able to utilize
her informational advantage. If the dealer identi￿es the customer as uninformed she is
likely to be patient as the risk of a substantial price change is perceived as little. A strat-
egy where a dealer uses market orders in the interdealer market after receiving informed
customer trades and limit orders when receiving uninformed customer trades thus seems
to be reasonable. This is also in line with Osler (2008) who concludes that a dealer in
the foreign exchange market is more likely to place a market order after trading with
an informed customer than after trading with an uninformed customer. If dealers follow
this strategy, interdealer order ￿ ow should be more informative than customer order ￿ ow.
While interdealer order ￿ ow will re￿ ect informed customer trades, customer order ￿ ow
re￿ ects the sum of uninformed and informed customer order ￿ ow.
Dealers may follow strategies di⁄erent from the one described above. Dealer strategies
can vary according to market settings, risk limits and other market conditions. However,
if a majority of the dealers normally follow the strategy described in Figure 2, aggregate
interdealer order ￿ ow should be more informative than aggregate customer order ￿ ow.
This paper will focus on the strategy described above. Interdealer order ￿ ow can also
be more informative than customer order ￿ ow because dealers are better informed than
11If the customer buys from the dealer, the dealer will buy in the interdealer market and vice versa.
16their customers. By aggregating information from observed trades and interpreting public
information a dealer can acquire superior information. Thus, interdealer order ￿ ow can
be informative because it re￿ ects informed customer trades or because dealers are skilled
in acquiring superior information.
Customer trades and dealer skill appear to be two important sources of information
in interdealer order ￿ ow. If a dealer￿ s main source of information is her customer trades
and she follows the strategy in Figure 2, her informed customer trades will re￿ ected in
her interdealer order ￿ ow. In this case, we would expect a high correlation between the
customer order ￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow of the dealer. If she has a high share
of informed customer trades her interdealer order ￿ ow will be more informative than if
she has a low share. It will also be less informative if she has problems to distinguish
informed and uninformed customers. If a dealer￿ s main source of information is her skill
in obtaining superior information. Superior information could be gained through the
dealer￿ s skill in interpreting private and public information. In this case the dealer will
trade in the interdealer market independently of her trades in the customer market and
one would expect that the link between the customer order ￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow
is relatively low.
5 Econometric framework and results
In order to explore the role of dealers in the price discovery process we ￿rst investigate the
price impact of aggregate order ￿ ow. If aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow explains daily yield
changes we conclude that at least some dealers possess relevant information and play a role
in the price formation process. If aggregate customer order ￿ ow can explain daily yield
changes we conclude that customer trades contain information relevant for bond yields.
If both interdealer order ￿ ow and customer order ￿ ow can explain daily yield changes
we conclude that customer trades are one source of information for dealers. However,
aggregate customer order ￿ ow consists of both informed and uninformed customer trades.
As the trades of informed and uninformed customers could cancel each other out, it would
be preferable to have a measure that includes informed customer trades only. We employ
delayed publication customer trades as a proxy for informed customer trades. Comparing
17the informational content of this proxy to aggregate customer order ￿ ow will indicate
whether dealers are able to identify their informed customers. We then investigate whether
informed customers could be an important source of information for dealers by comparing
the informational content of informed customer order ￿ ow to that of interdealer order ￿ ow
orthogonal to informed customer order ￿ ow.
We then investigate the informational content of order ￿ ow at a disaggregated level. We
compare the informativeness of interdealer order ￿ ow at the individual dealer level. The
availability of dealer identities enables the calculation of individual dealer interdealer order
￿ ow and individual dealer customer order ￿ ow. First, the contribution of short, medium
and long term interdealer order ￿ ow to 3, 5 and 10 year yield changes are explored for each
dealer. Then the relationship between each dealer￿ s interdealer order ￿ ow and customer
order ￿ ow is investigated. If customer order ￿ ow explains a signi￿cant part of interdealer
order ￿ ow for a dealer, and the dealer￿ s interdealer order ￿ ow is informative, it could
indicate that the dealer has informed customers who are the source of her information. If
customer order ￿ ow does not explain interdealer order ￿ ow, and the dealer￿ s interdealer
order ￿ ow is informative, it is likely that her main source of information is something
else, which could be dealer skill in collecting and interpreting relevant information. These
hypotheses are tested below.
5.1 Aggregate order ￿ ow
To compare the price impact of aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow and aggregate customer
order ￿ ow in the Norwegian government bond market we run the following regression,
dY i






t + et; (1)
where dY i
t is the yield change of the ith maturity from day t ￿ 1 to day t where i = 3,
5 and 10 years, c is a constant, OFS
t ; OFM
t and OFL
t are short, medium and long term
aggregate interdealer order ￿ ows and COFS
t ; COFM
t and COFL
t are short, medium and
long term aggregate customer order ￿ ows on day t. To control for the impact of past
yield changes, the lagged ￿rst principal component of yields, F1t￿1, is also included in the
regression.
18The results are presented in Table 6. The R2s document that interdealer order ￿ ow
explains about one fourth of daily yield changes, which is in line with Brandt and Kavajecz
(2004). This indicates that the price formation process in the Norwegian government bond
market is consistent with that of the Treasury market, and suggests that the ￿ndings in
this study are relevant for sovereign bond markets in general. It further appears that
while interdealer order ￿ ows of all maturities are highly signi￿cant, customer order ￿ ows
only have signi￿cant e⁄ects on 10-year yield changes. The lagged yield factor, F1t￿1,
has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on any maturity. Interdealer order ￿ ow of all maturities has a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on all yield changes, and the e⁄ect is greatest on same maturity yield
changes. An increase in short term interdealer order ￿ ow of one standard deviation will
lead to a decrease in the 3 year yield of 1.3 basis point. This corresponds to an annual
decrease of 3.4 percentage points. The results indicate that interdealer order ￿ ow has a
much larger e⁄ect on daily yield changes than customer order ￿ ow.
The results in Table 6 indicate that the trading strategy depicted in Figure 2 is followed
by at least some dealers. Aggregate customer order ￿ ow has no impact on 3 and 5 year
yield changes. Long term customer order ￿ ow has a signi￿cant impact on 10 year yield
changes, but the e⁄ect is smaller than for long term interdealer order ￿ ow. These results
may indicate that there are many uninformed customers, and that the trades of these
customers "o⁄set" the trades of informed customers.
According to market microstructure theory price changes caused by order ￿ ow could
be due to private information or to inventory e⁄ects. While inventory e⁄ects are expected
to be temporary, new information will lead to a permanent change in prices. To control
for inventory e⁄ects, an unrestricted VAR model is employed. Endogenous variables in
the VAR model are interdealer order ￿ ow and yield changes. By calculating accumulated
impulse responses over a 10 day period, it is possible to observe whether the price impact
is permanent or not.12 The results are shown in Figures 3 to 5. Figure 3 shows that a
unit shock to short term interdealer order ￿ ow leads to a reduction of 2 to 3 basis points
in the 3 year yield. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that a unit shock to interdealer order ￿ ow
of all maturities leads to a reduction of about 2 basis points in the 5 and 10 year yields.
The ￿gures con￿rm the results in Table 6 which show that each maturity has the largest
12A lag-length of 2 is employed, which in line with the Aikaike and Schwartz information criteria.
19response to its ￿own￿order ￿ ow imbalance. The impulse responses clearly indicate that
the e⁄ect of order ￿ ow on yield changes is permanent. This is in line with Brandt and
Kavajecz (2004) who ￿nd that interdealer order ￿ ow contains private information relevant
for bond prices. The results also supports the ￿ndings of Manaster and Mann (1996),
Osler, Mende and Menkho⁄ (2007) and Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008), but appear to
be in opposition to the ￿ndings in Menkveld, Sarkar and van der Wel (2011).
In order to check the consequences of including all days versus including no-news days
only, we have compared the e⁄ect of order ￿ ow on yield changes in both cases. News days
were identi￿ed as the 3 days surrounding the release of the monthly Consumer Price Index
and the press release from Monetary Policy meetings. The results, that are not shown
in the paper, indicate that the e⁄ects of order ￿ ow were higher on no-news days than
on all days.13 Another reason for including all days is that there is a stream of more or
less important public news every day. It is thus di¢ cult to eliminate the direct e⁄ect of
public news completely. In addition, some studies show that the indirect channel of price
formation is at work on news days also. Green (2004) ￿nds that order ￿ ow helps determine
the in￿ uence of new information on prices in the minutes after an announcement is made.
These ￿ndings support the inclusion of all days when measuring the price impact of order
￿ ow.
5.2 Informed customer order ￿ ow
The results so far show that aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow contains information while
aggregate customer order ￿ ow does not. This does not imply that all customers are unin-
formed, but indicates that the trades of informed customers are not re￿ ected in aggregate
customer order ￿ ow. One way to explore whether some customers are informed, is to ￿nd
a proxy for informed customer order ￿ ow. By utilizing the data set available in this study,
it is possible to construct order ￿ ow based on the trade type delayed publication. Since
dealers have the option to enter an additional code for delayed publication when they
register a trade, it can be assumed that dealers will choose to do this when they receive a
perceived informed customer trade. After May 2002 dealers were able to set the code for
delayed publication as a default, and it is possible that some dealers then included both
13The results are available upon request.
20informed and uninformed customer trades in this category. This change can have altered
the information content in delayed publication trades, and we will test for this. In order to
explore whether informed customer trades are a source of information in interdealer order
￿ ow, we ￿rst use delayed publication customer trades as a proxy for informed customer
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t are short, medium and long term interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal
to the informed customer trades in the same maturity group. These variables are derived
as follows
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where i = S;M;L is short, medium and long term order ￿ ow and ￿i
t; is the residual
obtained by regressing informed customer order ￿ ow on aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow
for each maturity group. By orthogonalizing the interdealer order ￿ ow in this way we
remove the part of the order ￿ ow that is related to informed customer trades. The model
in equation (2) states that daily yield changes are explained by the lagged yield factor,
contemporaneous interdealer order ￿ ow unrelated to informed customer trades and con-
temporaneous informed customer order ￿ ow. The model is run for the whole sample
period and for two sub-periods. The conditions for entering delayed publication trades
were changed in May 2002 and this may have lead to a change in dealer behavior. Since
the size limit was lifted in May 2002, some dealers can have used the possibility to delay
the publication of their customer trades regardless of whether they were considered to be
informed or not. This is consistent with an increase in the number of delayed publication
trades seen in the data from mid-2002. In order to investigate any change in the informa-
tion content the order ￿ ow based on these trades we split the sample period in two. The
￿rst sub-period is from September 1999 to May 2002 and the second sub-period is from
May 2002 to September 2005.
21Table 7 presents the results for all yield changes. The ￿rst column for the 3, 5 and 10
year yield changes show the results for the whole sample period. Short, medium and long
term interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal to informed customer order ￿ ow have signi￿cant
explanatory power for daily yield changes. The coe¢ cients are signi￿cant for all maturities
and are of the same order of magnitude as the coe¢ cients for interdealer order ￿ ow in
Table 6. Also long term informed customer order ￿ ow has signi￿cant explanatory power
for daily yield changes over the whole period. The second and third column for each bond
maturity in Table 7 show the results for the two sub-periods. The results indicate that the
e⁄ect of informed customer order ￿ ow on yield changes was strongest in the ￿rst period
when the conditions for entering delayed publication trades were stricter than in the second
period. This supports the assumption that the informed customer trades are more likely
to contain both informed and uninformed customer trades in the second sub-period. The
e⁄ect of long term informed customer order ￿ ow on 3-year yield changes is only signi￿cant
in the ￿rst sub-period. The e⁄ect of long term informed customer order ￿ ow on 10-year
yield changes is signi￿cant in both sub-periods, but the coe¢ cient is higher in the ￿rst
sub-period. The results show that interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal to informed customer
order ￿ ow has signi￿cant explanatory power for daily yield changes of all maturities. Only
long term informed customer ￿ ow has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on yield changes and the e⁄ect
is considerably smaller than that of interdealer order ￿ ow. Taken together these ￿ndings
suggest that dealer skill can be a source of information in interdealer order ￿ ow.
In order to test whether our proxy of informed customer trades contains more infor-
mation than total customer trades we compare the explanatory power of the order ￿ ows
based on these trades. Aggregate customer order ￿ ow re￿ ects the trades of both informed
and uninformed customers whereas delayed publication customer order ￿ ow is assumed to
re￿ ect the trades of informed customers only. We therefore expect our proxy of informed
customer order ￿ ow to contain more information than aggregate customer order ￿ ow. We
employ the following two models to explore this:
dY i
t = c + COFS
t + COFM
t + COFL
t + "t; (4)
dY i
t = c + HCOFS
t + HCOFM
t + HCOFL
t + ￿t; (5)
22where dY i
t , i = 3;5;10; represent changes in 3, 5 and 10 year government bond yields.
The results of the two models are displayed in Table 8. The results from the model
presented in equation (4) are shown in the ￿rst four lines and the results from the model
in equation (5) are shown in the next four lines. The results reveal that informed customer
order ￿ ow has some explanatory power for daily yield changes while aggregate customer
order ￿ ow has close to zero. The higher explanatory power of informed customer order
￿ ow, especially in the ￿rst sub-period, indicates that the proxy works best in the ￿rst
period. In the second period the proxy is more imprecise due to the changes in the
conditions for entering delayed publication trades in mid-2002.
The results in Table 8 show that short and medium term aggregate customer order
￿ ow cannot explain daily yield changes. Long term customer order ￿ ow, however, has
signi￿cant impact on daily yield changes. The results further show that the proxy for
informed customer order ￿ ow has somewhat higher explanatory power than the total
customer order ￿ ow. In line with the results in Table 7, the informational content of
delayed publication trades appear to be higher in the ￿rst sub-period than in the second.
In all, the results in this section suggest that dealers possess more information than
their customers, and that dealers appear to play an important role in the price formation
process in sovereign bond markets. Aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow explains up to 25 per-
cent of contemporaneous yield changes. There is little information in aggregate customer
order ￿ ow. A proxy for informed customer trades, delayed publication customer trades,
contains more information than aggregate customer trades, but works best in the ￿rst pe-
riod of the data set, until May 2002, due to changes in the conditions for entering delayed
publication trades. Informed customer trades thus appear to be one source of informa-
tion in interdealer order ￿ ow. However, the fact that interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal to
informed customer trades explains most of the daily yield changes, indicates that dealers
have other sources of information. One important source could be dealer skill. Examples
of dealer skill are superior interpretations of public information, e⁄ort in collecting infor-
mation from other dealers through trading in the interdealer market and dealer skill in
identifying and aggregate information in customer trades. In order to further explore the
role of dealer skill and customer trades as sources of information in interdealer order ￿ ow,
the next section explores the sources of information in individual dealer interdealer order
23￿ ow.
5.3 Individual dealer order ￿ ow
The previous two sections document that dealers play an important role in the price
formation process in government bond markets. In order to better understand how bond
prices are formed it would be useful to know whether dealers play di⁄erent roles in the
price formation process and whether they have di⁄erent sources of information. One of
the main contributions of this paper is to explore the e⁄ects of individual dealer order ￿ ow
on yield changes. This facilitates an investigation of whether information is symmetrically
distributed among dealers or not. By determining the relationship between a dealer￿ s
interdealer order ￿ ow and her customer order ￿ ow, it is possible to decide whether customer
orders are an important source of information or not. Seven dealers, constituting about 85
percent of the sample, are included in this part of the analysis. These seven dealers have
been trading in government bonds throughout the whole sample period.14 The dealers are
characterized by size, the size of their customer base and their interdealer activity. Size
is measured as a dealer￿ s total market share in the customer market and the interdealer
market combined. The size of the customer base is measured as a dealer￿ s market share in
the customer market. Interdealer activity is measured as the value of a dealer￿ s initiated
interdealer trades relative to the value of her customer trades. This ratio may indicate
whether a dealer possesses private information. If she is informed she is likely to be
impatient and initiate trades because she wants to utilize this information before other
dealers learn about it. A high share of initiated interdealer trades may thus indicate that
a dealer is exerting e⁄ort to collect relevant information and is skilled in interpreting it.
A low share of initiated interdealer trades may indicate that a dealer is passive because
she has no skill.
Table 9 presents the characteristics of the seven dealers. They are numbered according
to size as shown in column 1. Size which is measured by the total market share of each
dealer is displayed in the second column. There are four large dealers, with a total market
share in the customer and interdealer market ranging from 17 to 24 percent, constituting
14The order ￿ ow of dealers who were not present in the market for a substantial part of the sample
period and dealers who only sporadically traded, are not included in this section.
2485 percent of the seven dealers￿ s total market share. The remaining three dealers are
small, with a total market share of 15 percent. The third column shows the size of each
dealer￿ s customer base as re￿ ected in their market share in the customer market. The
four large dealers also have the largest customer bases. The fourth column displays the
measure of interdealer activity which is initiated interdealer trades over customer trades.
Among the four large dealers, Dealer 2 appears to be passive, with a low share of initiated
trades in the interdealer market. Dealer 3 appears to be active in the interdealer market
which can indicate that she is informed. Among the small dealers, Dealer 7 is very active
in the interdealer market while having a very small customer base.
To measure the contemporaneous price impact of the di⁄erent dealers, the following
model is employed
dY i
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j;t are the short, medium and long term interdealer order
￿ ow of Dealer j ( j = 1;2;3;4;5;6;7) at time t.15 The results are displayed in Table 10
and suggest that dealers are heterogeneous. All dealers appear to play a signi￿cant role in
price discovery, but the impact varies between dealers. The interdealer order ￿ ow of some
dealers appear to have a stronger e⁄ect on daily yield changes than that of others, and
while the order ￿ ow of some dealers have explanatory power for short term yield changes,
the order ￿ ow of others can explain long term yield changes. Also, the table shows that
the short, medium and long term interdealer order ￿ ow of di⁄erent dealers has di⁄erent
impact on daily yield changes. In the price discovery process for 3-year bonds, Dealer
1 plays the most important role as a one standard deviation increase in her short term
order ￿ ow leads to a decrease of more than one basis point in the 3-year yield. Dealer
1 is a large dealer measured by total market share and has a relatively high interdealer
activity which could indicate that she is informed. The interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer
1 also has the largest impact on 5 year yield changes. However, Dealer 4 plays the most
important role in the price discovery process for 10 year yields, closely followed by Dealer
1 and Dealer 2. Also Dealer 4 is a large dealer with a relatively high interdealer activity.
15The correlations between the interdealer order ￿ ows of the di⁄erent dealers are ranging from -18 to
+15 percent indicating that the order ￿ ows could have di⁄erent e⁄ects on yield changes.
25The order ￿ ows of Dealer 2, Dealer 5 and Dealer 6 also have signi￿cant explanatory power
for daily yield changes. This indicates that smaller dealers also contribute to the process
of price discovery in bond markets. The table further shows that dealers appear to have
di⁄erent information in their short, medium and long term order ￿ ow. While the short
and medium term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 appear to be most informative for 5
year yield changes, the long term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 2 is most informative for
the same maturity yield changes.
Since the interdealer order ￿ ow of individual dealers contribute di⁄erently to the price
discovery process, we check whether dealers have di⁄erent sources of information. In order
to do this we investigate the link between customer order ￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow
for each dealer by running the following regression:
OFi




j;t is the interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer j, COFi
j;t and COFi
j;t￿1 are the customer
order ￿ ow of Dealer j at time t and time t ￿ 1 for i = S (short term), M (medium term)
and L (long term), and j=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
The results are presented in Table 11. The explanatory power of contemporaneous
and one day lagged customer order ￿ ow for interdealer order ￿ ow varies substantially
between dealers. For Dealer 1 today￿ s and yesterday￿ s customer order ￿ ow explain a lot
of Dealer 1￿ s short term interdealer order ￿ ow. This indicates that customer trades are
an important source of information for Dealer 1. For Dealer 4 there appears to be no link
between long term customer order ￿ ow and long term interdealer order ￿ ow. Her long
term customer order ￿ ows today and yesterday have no explanatory power for today￿ s
long term interdealer order ￿ ow. Since the long term order ￿ ow of Dealer 4 plays an
important role in the price discovery for 10 year yields, this indicates that Dealer 4 does
not have customer trades as her main source of information. Rather, this points to skill
as an important source of information for this dealer. For the other dealers, customer
trades can be one source of information, but the link between customer order ￿ ow and
interdealer order ￿ ow is weaker than for Dealer 1. The exception is Dealer 6 who also has
a strong link between customer and interdealer orders a the long end of the yield curve.
26This could indicate that Dealer 1 and Dealer 6 have a higher share of informed customers
than the other dealers. It could also indicate that these dealers are skilled in that they
have a better ability to identify their informed customers than the other dealers.
The results in this section show that the order ￿ ow of di⁄erent dealers contribute
di⁄erently to the price formation process and indicate that dealers are heterogenous. The
information content of the interdealer order ￿ ow appear to vary between dealers, and the
maturity of the most informative order ￿ ow also varies. The interdealer order ￿ ow of large
dealers with a high bond market share appear to contain more information than the order
￿ ow of smaller dealers. The extent of interdealer activity does not appear to be important
for the information content of individual dealer order ￿ ow related to contemporaneous
yield changes. The results further indicate that dealers are relying on di⁄erent sources of
information. For some dealers customer trades explain a considerable part of interdealer
trades, up to 13 percent, while for other dealers customer trades have no explanatory power
for their interdealer trades. This may be due to di⁄erences in the size or composition of
their customer base, di⁄erences in dealer skill, but also in the objectives of the dealer
institutions. The information conveyed in aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow appear to be
based on di⁄erent sources of dealer information. This indicates that both aggregation of
asymmetric information held by market participants and heterogeneous interpretations of
public information are types of information imbedded into prices through the process of
price discovery.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the price discovery process in government bond markets by employing
a new, extensive data set from the Norwegian government bond market. The paper is the
￿rst to study price discovery in a two tier market with complete trading records in both
markets at the individual dealer level. Previous studies use more limited data sets (Osler,
Mende and Menkho⁄(2007)), aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow only (Brandt and Kavajecz
(2004)) or one tier markets (Manaster and Mann (1996), Menkveld, Sarkar and van der
Wel (2011) and Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008)).
The results reveal that while aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow is highly informative,
27aggregate customer order ￿ ow is not. A proxy for informed customer trades, delayed
publication trades, appear to contain some information relevant for bond yields. This
suggests that at least some dealers are able to identify of their informed customers. Some
dealers play an important part in the process of price discovery, while others have more
limited impact on yield changes. While there is a strong link between the customer order
￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow of some dealers, there is no such link for other dealers,
indicating that dealers have di⁄erent sources of information. While some dealers have
informed customer trades as their main source of information, other dealers appear to
be actively collecting and aggregating information, pointing to dealer skill as their main
source of information.
The ￿ndings in this paper suggest that dealers are not mere intermediaries of cus-
tomer trades, but play an independent role the price discovery process in government
bond markets. This supports the conclusion in Osler, Mende and Menkho⁄ (2007) that
price discovery takes place in the interdealer market. Both the currency market and the
government bond market are two tier markets, and the ￿ndings in this paper indicate that
both customer trades and dealer skill could be sources of information in interdealer order
￿ ow. These ￿ndings are in line with a dealer strategy which implies that a dealer will
pass on informed customer trades to the interdealer market as market orders, and pass on
uninformed customer trades as limit orders or hold on to them until they are netted by
opposite trades.
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30Table 1
Benchmark bonds
The table describes the government bonds that are included in the data
set, the number of trades in each bond, the share of interdealer trades in each
bond, and the average trade size of interdealer trades and customer trades in
each bond. The bonds are all bullet bonds with a remaining time to maturity
of ten or eleven years when ￿rst issued. The trades included are all trades
reported to Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) during the period September 1999 -
September 2005 except repo trades, auction results, and trades with a trade
size of less than 1 million NOK. The share of interdealer trades are measured
in percent of the total number of trades in each bond.
Bond Coup Issued Maturity Number Share Avg. trade size (mill.NOK)
name % date date of trades interdealer Interdealer Customer
S463 9.5 31.10.92 31.10.02 6 518 36 % 41.6 50.6
S465 5.75 30.11.93 30.11.04 12 307 34 % 27.3 38.8
S467 6.75 15.01.96 15.01.07 14 519 36 % 24.1 38.8
S468 5.50 15.05.98 15.05.09 14 692 36 % 18.6 36.5
S469 6.00 16.05.00 16.05.11 10 966 35 % 18.9 41.1
S470 6.50 15.05.02 15.05.13 5 956 41 % 17.6 42.3
S471 5.00 15.05.04 15.05.15 1 688 24 % 19.0 52.2
All 66 646 35 % 23.6 40.5
31Table 2
Descriptives for yield changes, interdealer and customer order
￿ ow
The table displays descriptive statistics for yield changes and interdealer and cus-
tomer order ￿ ows in the period September 1999 to September 2005. The table includes
data for the whole sample and two sub-samples; no-news days and news days. News
days are de￿ned as the days of CPI announcements and MPC announcements and the
two days surrounding the announcements, in total 361 days. Yield changes are daily
changes in synthetic 3, 5 and 10 year government bond yields based on the benchmark
bonds in Table 1. Yield changes are measured in basis points (0.01 percentage points).
Order ￿ ow is divided into groups according to the remaining time to maturity of the
bonds that are included. Short term order ￿ ow, OFS and COFS, re￿ ects bonds
with maturity between 1 and 4 years, medium term order ￿ ow, OFM and COFM,
re￿ ects bonds with maturity greater than 4 years up to 7 years and long term order
￿ ow, OFL and COFL, re￿ ects bonds with maturity greater than 7 years up to 11
years. Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
All days No-news days News days










































































Descriptive statistics informed customer order ￿ ow and orthogonal
interdealer order ￿ ow
The table presents the descriptive statistics for short, medium and long
term informed customer order ￿ ow (delayed publication customer order ￿ ow)
and interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal to informed customer order ￿ ow. The
statistics are based on all days in the sample.
Series obs mean std.err minimum maximum AR(1)
HCOFS 1504 -0.09 3.07 -18 13 0.105
HCOFM 1504 0.17 2.37 -12 14 0.068
HCOFL 1504 -0.19 2.72 -15 14 0.058
resOFS 1504 0.00 3.75 -26 23 0.144
resOFM 1504 0.00 3.67 -25 27 0.053
resOFL 1504 0.00 4.39 -28 21 0.097
33Table 4
Correlations
The table shows the unconditional correlations between yield changes, ag-
gregate interdealer order ￿ ow and customer order ￿ ow for the period Sep-
tember 1999 ￿September 2005. Yield changes are daily changes in synthetic
3, 5 and 10 year government bond yields based on the benchmark bonds in
Table 1. The order ￿ ow variables are divided into short (OFSand COFS),
medium (OFMand COFM) and long term (OFL and COFL) according to
the remaining time to maturity of the bonds included. Numbers in parenthesis
are p-values.































































































Principal components of yields and order ￿ ow
The table presents the factor structures of yields and order ￿ ow. The
table shows the loadings of the three orthogonal factors extracted from the
correlation matrix of yields, short, medium and long term interdealer order
￿ ow, and short, medium and long term customer order ￿ ow. The principal
components analysis is based on data including all days during the period
September 1999 to September 2005. The factors are ordered according to how
much they explain of the total variation.
F1 F2 F3
Yields
3 year 0.577 -0.653 0.491
5 year 0.580 -0.096 -0.809
10 year 0.575 0.751 0.323
% explained 0.990 0.010 0.000
OF (interdealer)
1-4 years 0.567 -0.679 0.467
4-7 years 0.604 -0.043 -0.796
7-11 years 0.561 0.733 0.385
% explained 0.482 0.270 0.248
COF (customer)
1-4 years 0.616 -0.454 0.644
4-7 years 0.668 -0.134 -0.732
7-11 years 0.418 0.881 0.221
% explained 0.396 0.322 0.282
35Table 6
Response of daily yield changes to aggregate order ￿ ow







t ; on day t on short, medium and long term interdealer order ￿ ow,
OFS, OFM and OFL, and short, medium and long term customer order ￿ ow,
COFS, COFM and COFL, between time t-1 and time t, and the ￿rst yield factor
at time t-1. The regressions are based on data for all days and include a constant, but
the coe¢ cients for the constant are dropped here. The coe¢ cients are corrected for
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity by the Newey-West method. Coe¢ cients are
multiplied with 100 and in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level and starred
























































Adj:R2 0:223 0:235 0:226
36Table 7
Response of daily yield changes to informed customer order ￿ ow
and interdealer order ￿ ow orthogonal to informed customer order
￿ ow
The table presents the results of regressing daily yield changes on aggregate








t . The regressions are based on data for the whole period 1999-
2005, and for the two sub-periods 1999-2002 and 2002-2005. The ￿rst principal
component of yields at time t-1 and a constant are included in the regressions,
but the coe¢ cients are dropped here. The coe¢ cients are corrected for auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity by the Newey-West method. Coe¢ cients
are multiplied with 100 and in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level




























































































































Adj:R2 0:225 0:230 0:236 0:236 0:212 0:268 0:227 0:205 0:264
37Table 8
Response of daily yield changes to aggregate customer order ￿ ow
and informed customer order ￿ ow
The table presents the results of regressing daily yield changes on aggregate
customer order ￿ ow, COFS
t ;COFM
t and COFL
t , and on informed customer or-




t . The regressions are based on data for the whole period 1999-2005
and the two sub-periods 1999-2002 and 2002-2005. The coe¢ cients are cor-
rected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity by the Newey-West method.
Coe¢ cients are multiplied with 100 and in bold when signi￿cant at the 10
percent level and starred when signi￿cant at the 5 percent level or better.




























































































































Adj:R2 0:004 0:022 0:001 0:004 0:012 0:002 0:011 0:020 0:008
38Table 9
Characteristics of individual dealers
The table describes the seven dealers who were active in the government bond mar-
ket during the period 1999 to 2005. They are characterized by size, size of customer
base and their activity in the interdealer market. Size is measured as total market
share, calculated as the gross value of customer trades and initiated interdealer trades
by the dealer as a percentage of the total value of both markets combined. Customer
base is measured as the market share in the customer market, calculated as the gross
value of a dealers￿ s customer trades as a percentage of total customer trades. Inter-
dealer activity is measured as the value of a dealer￿ s initiated interdealer trades over
the value of her customer trades.
Dealer Size Customer base Interdealer activity
Total Customer Interdealer trades
market share market share Customer trades
1 24 % 24 % 31
2 23 % 25 % 19
3 21 % 19 % 42
4 17 % 18 % 28
5 9 % 9 % 33
6 4 % 4 % 30
7 2 % 1 % 435
39Table 10
Response of daily yield changes to interdealer order ￿ ow of indi-
vidual dealers
The table presents the results of regressing daily yield changes on individual dealer
interdealer order ￿ ow, OFS
i;t;OFM
i;t and OFL
i;t. The regressions are based on the period
1999-2005. The coe¢ cients are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
by the Newey-West method. Coe¢ cients are multiplied with 100 and in bold when
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level and starred when signi￿cant at the 5 percent level



































































































































































Response of interdealer order ￿ ow to customer order ￿ ow
The table presents the results of regressing the short, medium and long term
interdealer order ￿ ow, measured as net volume (in Norwegian kroner) on day t on the
short, medium and long term customer order ￿ ow on time t and t-1 for individual
dealers. Coe¢ cients are multiplied with 100 and in bold when signi￿cant at the
10 percent level and starred when signi￿cant at the 5 percent level or better. T-
statisics are in parenthesis. The coe¢ cients are corrected for autocorrelation and






































































































































41Figure 1: Trading in the secondary market for government bonds in Norway
Customer market Customer market
Interdealer
market
Bond trading system - SAXESS
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43Figure 3: The ￿gure shows the accumulated response of 3 year yield changes to a unit
innovation in interdealer order ￿ ow. The ￿rst picture shows the response to a unit inno-
vation in short term order ￿ ow, OFS, the second picture the response to a unit innovation
in medium term order ￿ ow, OFM, and the third picture the response to a unit innovation
in long term order ￿ ow, OFL.
44Figure 4: The ￿gure shows the accumulated response of 5 year yield changes to a unit
innovation in interdealer order ￿ ow. The ￿rst picture shows the response to a unit inno-
vation in short term order ￿ ow, OFS, the second picture the response to a unit innovation
in medium term order ￿ ow, OFM, and the third picture the response to a unit innovation
in long term order ￿ ow, OFL.
45Figure 5: The ￿gure shows the accumulated response of 10 year yield changes to a unit
innovation in interdealer order ￿ ow. The ￿rst picture shows the response to a unit inno-
vation in short term order ￿ ow, OFS, the second picture the response to a unit innovation
in medium term order ￿ ow, OFM, and the third picture the response to a unit innovation
in long term order ￿ ow, OFL.
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